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Abstract
This paper is about the effectiveness of qualitative easing, a form of unconventional
monetary policy that changes the risk composition of the central bank balance sheet. We
construct a general equilibrium model where agents have rational expectations and there
is a complete set of financial securities, but where some agents are unable to participate
in financial markets. We show that a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s
balance sheet affects equilibrium asset prices and economic activity. We prove that, in
our model, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes non-fundamental fluctuations in
the stock market is self-financing and leads to a Pareto efficient outcome.
Key Words
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Central banks throughout the world have engaged in two kinds of unconventional
monetary policies: quantitative easing (QE), which is “an increase in the size of the
balance sheet of the central bank through an increase in its monetary liabilities”, and
qualitative easing (QualE) which is “a shift in the composition of the assets of the central
bank towards less liquid and riskier assets, holding constant the size of the balance sheet.”1
Because qualitative easing is conducted by the central bank, it is often classified as a
monetary policy. But because it adds risk to the public balance sheet that is ultimately
borne by the taxpayer, QualE is better thought of as a fiscal or quasi-fiscal policy (Buiter,
2010). This distinction is important because, in order to be effective, QualE necessarily
redistributes resources from one group of agents to another.
In theoretical papers that study the effectiveness of QualE, researchers often assume
that financial markets are complete and that everyone has access to them. When these
two conditions hold, a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s balance sheet
has no effect on asset prices (Woodford, 2012): QualE is ineffective because market
participants are able to undo the effects of a portfolio shift by the central bank through
private trades in securities. We will demonstrate here that when we relax the assumption
of complete participation, QualE starts being effective because it redistributes resources
across states of nature for agents unable to insure themselves in financial markets.
We make the case for the effectiveness of qualitative easing by constructing an ana-
lytically tractable general equilibrium model where agents are rational and have rational
expectations, and where the financial markets are complete. Our setup has two impor-
tant features. First, some people in our model do not trade in the financial markets.
Second, people in our model use money as a medium of exchange. These assumptions
ensure that, in the absence of uncertainty, the model possesses multiple equilibria. It also
implies that the underlying mechanism is different from that in Arajo et al. (2015), and
can be seen as an application of the insights of Cass and Shell (1983) and Balasko and
Shell (1993) to the study of QualE effectiveness in a monetary economy.
1The quotes are from Buiter (2008).
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We focus on sunspot shocks because we believe they play a key role in periods of
financial distress and are important drivers of financial volatility.2 We show that when
these non-fundamental disturbances play a dominant role, then a central bank that takes
risk onto its balance sheet can replicate the efficient, full-participation allocation, and
that the optimal intervention is self-financing. Importantly, in such circumstances, the
policy can be implemented by stabilizing equity prices so that the return to the stock
market is equal in every state to the return on a one-period real government bond. While
these implementation recommendations are sensitive to the assumed mixture of shocks,
the broader result obtains even when all shocks are fundamental: In the presence of
incomplete asset market participation, unconventional monetary policy matters and can
be used to engineer the efficient, full-participation allocation.
1. How our Model is Related to Previous Literature
Our model is related to the work of Cass and Shell (1983). These authors construct
a two-period, purely real, pure-exchange general-equilibrium model. In the first period
households trade financial assets. In the second period they trade goods. In the Cass-
Shell example there are multiple equilibria in the second period. They show that, if some
households are not present in period 1, purely non-fundamental uncertainty can influence
the equilibrium allocation of goods across households.
We adapt the Cass-Shell example in two ways. First, we introduce money as a
medium of exchange. Second, we build a model with production rather than pure ex-
change. Adding money allows us to explain the distinction between conventional mone-
tary policy, which alters the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, and unconventional
2Standard accounts of asset market dynamics struggle to account for the volume of trades that we
observe in real world asset markets (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), and for the observed volatility in asset
prices, relative to dividend movements (Shiller, 1981). In our view, significant portions of asset price
fluctuations in the real world are caused by self-fulfilling shifts from one equilibrium to another that
are associated with inefficient fluctuations in wealth (see also Farmer (2014) and Farmer (2015)).
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monetary policy, which alters its composition between safe and risky assets. Adding
production allows us to explain how unconventional monetary policy can alter output.3
Although it is possible to construct fully dynamic examples of the argument we make
in this paper, we have chosen instead to use a two-period model to keep the argument
as simple as possible.4 That presents the challenge of explaining why the agents would
choose to hold an asset, fiat money, that will be worthless when the model ends. To meet
that challenge, we adopt a device proposed by Starr (1974) and used by Balasko and
Shell (1993). We assume that money is required to pay taxes at the end of the second
period. Money has value in our model because the government decrees it to be so.
Related work of which we are aware includes papers by McMahon and Polemarchakis
(2011) and McMahon et al. (2018). Although the environments they consider are similar
to ours, these authors do not study the optimal monetary policy and they do not explicitly
model an equilibrium selection rule as we do here. Hall and Reis (2016) have studied
the implications of policies that pay interest on reserves for price level stabilization and
Reis (2016) studies the role of unconventional monetary policies in response to a future
fiscal crisis. Neither of these approaches considers the implications, for monetary policy,
of incomplete asset market participation.
Two alternative theories to ours include the market segmentation approach of
Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood et al. (2015). These authors posit that differ-
ent asset purchasers inhabit different segments of the market. Alternatively, Gertler and
Karadi (2011), Curdia and Woodford (2011) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) present
theories in which capital constraints may be alleviated by large scale central bank asset
purchases that offset the restrictions imposed by borrowing constraints. Our own work is
complementary to both the segmentation approach and the capital constraints theories,
3To model money, we include the real value of money balances as an argument of utility functions. This
approach originated with Patinkin (1956) and we think of it as a short-cut that explains why people
choose to hold an asset that is dominated in rate-of-return. For convenience, and to simplify algebra,
we assume that money, measured relative to the money wage, yields utility.
4See Farmer (2018) for an example of a dynamic model that uses a similar argument.
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though we highlight an alternative reason for incomplete participation: the typical half-
life of a company is about a decade (Daepp et al., 2015) and so prospective entrepreneurs
may not be able to insure against fluctuations in future profits, simply because the firms
that will generate those profits don’t exist today.5
2. A simple Two-Period Model
In this section we construct a simple stylized model that is, nevertheless, rich enough
to capture the main points of our argument.
2.1. Assumptions about Workers and Entrepreneurs. There are two periods, two
types of people and two public agents: a central bank and a treasury. We refer to type
1 people as workers and to type 2 people as entrepreneurs, with corresponding variables
indexed using the subscript i ∈ {1, 2}. Workers are alive in both periods and they are
each endowed, in period 2, with one unit of leisure. Entrepreneurs are alive only in period
2 and they are endowed with a technology for producing a unique consumption good in
that period. While these specific assumptions are meant to capture the relatively short
lifespan of private companies, in a more complicated model with multiple periods there
could be all types of agents present in all periods, as long as there would exist markets,
which some agents would be unable to trade in.
In period 1, workers trade in asset markets with the central bank and with the
treasury. Production and consumption take place only in period 2. There is a paper asset
called money, that is an argument of workers’ utility functions. We show in Appendix A
that workers face the following life-cycle budget constraint
pc1 + w(1− n1) + rM1 ≤ W , (1)
where,
W ≡ w + TR
Q
− T1 (2)
is the dollar value, at date 2, of a worker’s wealth, p is the dollar price of goods, w is
the money wage, Q is the price of a dollar valued pure-discount bond and r ≡ 1/Q − 1
5Clearly, the life spans of workers, while typically longer, tend to be finite as well.
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is the money interest rate. The terms n1, c1, M1, TR and T1 are, respectively, labour
supplied, consumption and money demanded, money transfers received by workers from
the treasury and nominal tax obligations of the workers.
2.2. Assumptions about the Treasury and the Central Bank. The treasury fi-
nances transfers to workers in period 1 by issuing dollar denominated discount bonds
that are worth B dollars in period 2 and sell for price Q in period 1. An amount ACB of
these bonds are purchased by the central bank to back the monetary base, M . Because
the bank does not pay interest on its liabilities, the creation of money generates equity,
ECB, for the central bank, equal to the present value of the bank’s seigniorage revenues,
S, where S is defined as S ≡ (ACB −M) = rM .
Assets Liabilities
QACB M
QS
ECB
Table 1. The Central Bank Balance Sheet
Table 1 represents the bank’s balance sheet in period 1. At date 2, the treasury
repays its debt by raising taxes T or from seigniorage revenues, S. The fact that the
treasury must remain solvent leads to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint,
Q(T + S) = TR. (3)
This equation clarifies that the dollar value of the transfer to the workers in period 1 is
equal to the present value of tax revenues plus the present value of seigniorage revenue.
Importantly, this can be seen as a variant of passive fiscal policy (Leeper, 1991) since the
government is assumed to balance its books for any underlying price level.6
2.3. The Equal Treatment Assumption. We assume that people alive in each period
are treated equally, and thus workers receive the entire transfer and entrepreneurs and
workers share the tax burden equally. It follows from the equal treatment assumption
6Because both liabilities and tax proceeds are assumed to be nominal, therefore the government cannot
rely on debt deflation to equate their respective values.
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that the per-person values of taxes and transfers in period 2, as functions of B and M ,
are
Ti =
(
B − rM
2
)
, i ∈ {1, 2} and TR
Q
= B. (4)
Crucially, fiscal policy reallocates from one group to another: because entrepreneurs are
not present in period 1, they do not benefit from the initial transfer; they do, however,
incur half of the cost of paying for the resulting fiscal obligations in period 2.
These assumptions allow us to express workers’ wealth in period 2 as follows,
W ≡ w +
(
B
2
+
rM
2
)
. (5)
This expression clarifies that the value of the transfer depends on both fiscal policy,
represented by B, and monetary policy, represented by M .7
3. Equilibria Under the Perfect Foresight Assumption
In this section we derive the demand and supply functions of workers and en-
trepreneurs and we define the concept of a competitive perfect foresight equilibrium.
Our main result is that, because different price levels correspond to different real values
of the nominal transfer, therefore real equilibrium allocations are affected by the value of
the numeraire.
3.1. The Behavior of Workers Under Certainty. Workers have logarithmic prefer-
ences defined over consumption, leisure and the real value of money balances in period 2
7 In words, Equation (5) says that the period 2 money value of the wealth of a worker is equal to the
money value of his leisure endowment plus 1/2 of the period 2 value of his transfer plus 1/2 of the
government’s seigniorage revenue from money creation. The first 1/2 fraction appears because workers
receive the entire government transfer but only have to repay half of it (1/2 = 1 − 1/2). The fraction
of seigniorage revenue follows from the fact that, for a given transfer, additional seigniorage revenues
reduce the tax burden on both types. More generally, the wealth effect of a transfer policy will depend
on the population growth rate and the period length.
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with weights λ on consumption, µ on leisure and γ, on real money balances,
U1 = λ log c1 + µ log(1− n1) + γ log
(
M1
w
)
,
where λ+µ+γ = 1. While the assumption of logarithmic utility is not important for the
construction of a perfect foresight equilibrium, it implies that entrepreneurs and workers
are risk averse, which will affect outcomes when we introduce uncertainty in Section
5. Crucially, because people are risk averse, equilibria where non-fundamental shocks
influence the allocation of goods across states are Pareto inefficient.
Workers maximize utility subject to the lifecycle budget constraint. The solution
to this problem, given the assumption of logarithmic preferences, is for the workers’
expenditure shares on leisure, consumption and money to equal the respective coefficients
in the utility function times wealth, W , that is,
w(1− n1) = µW , pc1 = λW , rM1 = γW . (6)
Rearranging terms in Equation (6), we obtain the following expression for the labour
supply function,
n1 = 1− µW
w
. (7)
3.2. The Behavior of Entrepreneurs Under Certainty. Entrepreneurs do not par-
ticipate in the asset markets since, by assumption, the companies they own start operating
in period 2. Each entrepreneur owns a decreasing returns-to-scale technology,
y = nα2
that transforms labour into output. Entrepreneurs receive real profits, Π ≡ nα2−(w/p)n2,
and they choose labour demand, n2, to solve the problem
max
{n2}
U2 = log
(
nα2 −
w
p
n2 − T2
p
)
,
where the argument of the logarithmic utility function represents the consumption of
entrepreneurs, which is assumed equal to the entrepreneur’s after tax profit. The solution
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to this problem is characterized by the labour demand and output supply functions,
n2 =
(
1
α
w
p
) 1
α−1
, y =
(
1
α
w
p
) α
α−1
, (8)
and the entrepreneurs’ consumption demand function,
c2 = (1− α)
(
1
α
w
p
) α
α−1
− (B − rM)
2p
, (9)
where we have made use of Equation (4) to write the dollar value of the entrepreneur’s
taxes, T2, as a function of fiscal policy, represented by B, and monetary policy, represented
by M .
3.3. The Definition of Perfect Foresight Equilibria. In this section we write down
three equations that characterize equilibria. These are the excess demand equations for
labour, consumption and money, which we set equal to zero in a competitive equilibrium.
These excess demand functions are given by the expressions,
Labour Demand︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
α
w
p
) 1
α−1
−
Labour Supply︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− µW
w
)
= 0, (10)
Entrepreneur’s Consumption︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)
(
1
α
w
p
) α
α−1
− (B − rM)
2p
+
Workers’ Consumption︷ ︸︸ ︷
w
p
λ
W
w
−
Output︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
α
w
p
) α
α−1
= 0, (11)
Money Demand︷︸︸︷
γ
W
r
−
Money Supply︷︸︸︷
M = 0. (12)
The three goods in our model are labour, consumption, and money. The three dollar
denominated prices are the money price of goods, p, the money wage, w, and the money
interest rate, r. We will characterize equilibria as feasible solutions to these equations.8
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a monetary policy and a fiscal policy {M,B},
an allocation {{ci, ni}i=1,2,M1, y} and a set of prices {p, w, r} that satisfies non-negativity,
8 It follows from Walras law that if the excess demands for money, goods and labour are equal to zero
then the quantity of bonds demanded is also equal to the quantity supplied.
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budget balance and optimality. An equilibrium price system is a non-negative triple
{p, w, r} such that equations (10), (11) and (12) hold.
Our definition of a competitive equilibrium is fairly standard. Proposition 1 establishes
that there is a continuum of equilibria and it characterizes them in closed form.
Proposition 1. Let {M,B} ≥ 0 characterize monetary and fiscal policy, and call w
feasible if it satisfies,
w ≥
(
µ+ αλ
)
B(
1 + λ− µ)− 2λα.
For all feasible values of w, there exists a competitive equilibrium indexed by w. The
equilibrium level of nominal wealth, the interest rate and the real wage are given by,
W = 2w +B
1 + λ+ µ
, r =
γ
M
W , w
p
= α
(
1− µW
w
)α−1
,
and the equilibrium values of {ni, ci}i∈1,2, y and M1 are determined by equations (6), (7),
(8)and (9). 
The role of the feasibility condition is to rule out wages that would result in negative
prices or negative allocations in one or more states. See Appendix B for a proof of this
proposition.
The intuition behind there being a continuum of equilibria in our model is sim-
ple. The government effectively reallocates resources from entrepreneurs to workers:
entrepreneurs pay taxes to finance government debt, but do not benefit from the initial
transfer.9 Since the transfer is nominal, changes in the price level pin down its real value.
Different real values of the transfer correspond to different real equilibrium allocations.
It may seem surprising, however, that the equilibrium nominal price (or wage) level
is not unique. Isn’t that somehow special to our two-period model? We believe not,
and there is, arguably, a fairly direct mapping from our setup to infinite-horizon, general
equilibrium models typically used for policy analysis. In particular, our example features
passive monetary policy – M is fixed in advance – and passive fiscal policy – the Treasury
sets taxes in nominal terms, which implies that it cannot count on fluctuations in the
9While workers also help pay off a share of the debt, they repay less than they received.
12
price level to help balance its books. It is well established (Leeper, 1991), that a passive-
passive combination of monetary and fiscal policies results in an indeterminate price level
– and this is precisely what occurs in our setup. As pointed out above, the existence of
a nominal, “intra-generational” transfer means that this nominal indeterminacy ends up
having real implications.
The fact that multiple equilibria arise in our model because monetary policy is as-
sumed to be passive may seem unappealing. Arguably, the Taylor principle, and the
monetary activism that it is associated with, are widely accepted as characterizing “good
policy”. Furthermore, Leeper (1991) shows that the more realistic, active - passive com-
bination of monetary and fiscal policies would guarantee price level uniqueness, which
would, in turn, eliminate real indeterminacy in our setup. In recent work (Farmer and
Zabczyk, 2019), however, we have demonstrated that Leeper’s (1991) findings do not
generalize to overlapping generations (OLG) models, and that the price level can be in-
determinate even under an active-passive policy combination (and indeed, as we show,
even under an active-active one) in the neighbourhood of dynamically efficient steady
states.10 It follows that our argument does not necessarily require monetary policy to
be “passive”, with Farmer and Zabczyk (2019) providing an example of a fully dynamic
environment where equilibrium prices and wages are potentially subject to pure sunspot
shocks, and where the QualE policy similar to the one we describe could help replicate
the efficient, “full-participation” equilibrium.
4. Introducing Uncertainty to the Model
In this section we expand the model to allow for non-fundamental uncertainty. We
assume that the workers anticipate, correctly, that there are two possible future realiza-
tions of the money wage. In one state of the world, state H, the nominal money wage is
high and in the other, state L, it is low.
10Incidentally, OLG models explicitly account for limited participation on account of mortality, instead
of the very convenient, but equally special, assumption of an infinitely-lived, representative agent un-
derlying extant work on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.
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4.1. Budget Constraints Under Uncertainty. We assume the existence of complete
insurance markets, represented by a pair of Arrow securities (Arrow, 1964), one for each
state. The H security pays one dollar if and only if state H occurs and the L security
pays one dollar if and only if state L occurs. The H security costs Q (H) dollars in period
1 and the L security costs Q (L) dollars. We use the symbol Q ≡ Q(H)+Q(L), to denote
the price of a pure discount bond that pays one dollar for sure.
Define the state prices of leisure and consumption as,
w˜ (ε) ≡ Q (ε)
Q
w (ε)
piε
and p˜ (ε) ≡ Q (ε)
Q
p (ε)
piε
, for ε ∈ {H,L}, (13)
and notice from this definition that
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
=
w (ε)
p (ε)
.
We show in Appendix C that the assumption of complete markets allows us to write a
single lifecycle budget constraint of a worker as follows,
E [p˜ (ε) c1 (ε) + w˜ (ε) (1− n1 (ε))] + rM1 ≤ W , (14)
and that worker’s wealth under uncertainty is defined as
W ≡ E[w˜ (ε)] +
(
B
2
+
rM
2
)
. (15)
Here, E is the expectations operator, defined using the probability distribution {piH , piL}
and the term in the last bracket is the net transfer from the government.
4.2. The Behaviour of Workers Under Uncertainty. Workers have preferences de-
fined over the probability weighted logarithm of consumption and leisure in each state
and over the logarithm of real balances,
U1 = E
[
λ log (c1 (ε)) + µ log(1− n1 (ε)) + γ log
(
M1
w (ε)
)]
,
where, as before, λ + µ + γ = 1. Workers maximize expected utility subject to their
lifecycle budget constraint represented by Equation (14). The solution to this problem
is for workers’ expenditure shares on leisure and consumption to equal the respective
14
coefficients in the utility function, weighted by probabilities, and for the expenditure
share on money to equal the unweighted utility coefficient,
w˜ (ε) (1− n1 (ε)) = µW , ε ∈ {H,L},
p˜ (ε) c1 (ε) = λW , ε ∈ {H,L},
rM1 = γW .
(16)
The probabilities piH and piL enter these equations through the definition of state prices,
Equation (13). Rearranging terms in the expenditure share for leisure leads to the labour
supply function in state ε,
n1 (ε) = 1− µ W
w˜ (ε)
, ε ∈ {H,L}.
4.3. The Behaviour of Entrepreneurs Under Uncertainty. The companies that
entrepreneurs eventually run are assumed not to exist in the initial period, which means
that they cannot insure against fluctuations in profits by trading Arrow securities. This
assumption implies that they solve two different problems, one for each realization of the
state. In state ε, entrepreneurs receive real profits Π (ε) ≡ n2 (ε)α − (w˜ (ε) /p˜ (ε))n2 (ε)
and they choose labour demand n2(ε), to solve the problem,
max
n2(ε)
U2 (ε) = log
(
n2 (ε)
α − w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
n2 (ε)− T2
p (ε)
)
.
The argument of the logarithmic utility function represents the consumption of the en-
trepreneurs and is also equal to their after-tax profits. The solution to this problem is
characterized by the state-dependent labour demand and output supply functions,
n2 (ε) =
(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) 1
α−1
, y (ε) =
(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) 1
α−1
, ε ∈ {H,L}, (17)
and the state-dependent consumption demand function,
c2 (ε) = (1− α)
(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) α
α−1
− w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
(B − rM)
2w (ε)
, ε ∈ {H,L}. (18)
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Recall that the state price, w˜(ε), is defined as w˜ (ε) ≡ [Q (ε)w (ε)] / [Qpiε] and notice that
w(ε) enters Equation (18) independently of w˜(ε). This is important and, mechanically,
it is the reason why different beliefs about the money wage have real effects: For every
self-fulfilling belief about w, there is a different real value of taxes and transfers.
5. Incomplete Participation Equilibrium in the World of Uncertainty
In Section 5, we explore the properties of equilibria in a world of uncertainty when
the asset markets are complete but entrepreneurs cannot participate in this market. We
show, in this world, that non-fundamental uncertainty may have real effects on the output
produced and on its allocation across people.
5.1. Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Incomplete Participation. The
model with two states has five goods: consumption in states H and L, leisure in states
H and L and money. There are four state-contingent prices, p˜ (H), p˜ (L), w˜ (H), w˜ (L),
and one non state-contingent interest rate, r. The following five excess demand functions
characterize equilibrium in the model with complete markets but incomplete participa-
tion11
Labour Demand︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
α
w˜(ε)
p˜(ε)
) 1
α−1
−
Labour Supply︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− µ W
w˜(ε)
)
= 0, ε ∈ {H,L} (19)
Entrepreneur’s Net Supply of Output︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
α
w˜(ε)
p˜(ε)
) 1
α−1
+
(B − rM)
2w(ε)
−
Workers’ Consumption︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ
W
w˜(ε)
= 0, ε ∈ {H,L} (20)
Money Demand︷︸︸︷
γ
W
r
−
Money Supply︷︸︸︷
M = 0. (21)
In any model with multiple equilibria we must take a stand on what selects an equi-
librium. Following Farmer (2012b), we select what will happen by modeling the way
11Equation (20) is derived from equating the sum of the consumptions demands of entrepreneurs and
workers to the supply of output, multiplying the equation by w˜(ε)/p˜(ε) and rearranging terms.
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people form beliefs. Specifically, to complete our characterization of a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium, we define the following belief function,
w (ε) = ϕ(M, ε) ≡M + ε. (22)
In a rational expectations equilibrium, these beliefs are not only fundamental, they are
also rational, i.e. fully consistent with actual equilibrium outcomes.
We have included the policy variable M in the belief function to capture the idea
that beliefs depend on observable variables. We have included the random variable ε
in the belief function to capture the idea that non-fundamental uncertainty may matter
simply because people believe that it will.12
Using the definitions of the market clearing equations, we define an incomplete par-
ticipation rational expectations equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2. An incomplete participation rational expectations equilibrium is:
• A monetary policy and a fiscal policy {M,B},
• A belief function ϕ(M, ε),
• An allocation which consists of
– A labour supply function n1 (ε) and consumption demands ci (ε) for i =
{1, 2},
– Functions for aggregate output y (ε) and labour demand n2(ε),
– Money demand M1,
• An equilibrium price system consisting of
– A price function p(ε) and a wage function w (ε),
– A security pricing function Q(ε),
– A money interest rate r =
1
Q(H) +Q(L)
− 1.
12Our example, where money is the only fundamental that affects beliefs, is very special. More generally,
beliefs about the future wage might depend on current and past wages, or on current and past output
or employment. For an example of a dynamic model closed with a belief function see Farmer (2012a).
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The allocation is such that equations (19), (20) and Equation (21) hold when the money
wage in each state is given by Equation (22) and the state prices are defined from the
equilibrium price system by Equation (13).
We next define a set of feasibility conditions on the properties of a belief function.
Definition 3. A belief function ϕ(M, ε) is feasible under monetary policy M and fiscal
policy B if w(ε) = ϕ(M, ε) satisfies,
w (ε) ≥
(
µ+ αλ
)
B(
1 + λ− µ)− 2λα, ε ∈ {H,L} . (23)
We now turn to a proposition that characterizes the properties of an incomplete par-
ticipation rational expectations equilibrium. To complete the statement of this proposi-
tion we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ(M, ε) be a feasible belief function and define the following numbers θ,
XL, YL, XH , YH , θ1 and θ2,
θ ≡ λ+ µ
γ
,
XL ≡ [2w (L) +B] , XH ≡ [2w (H) +B] , YL ≡ 2piLθ, YH ≡ 2piHθ,
θ1 ≡ [XH (1 + YL)−XL (1 + YH)]
XLYH
, θ2 ≡ XHYL
XLYH
.
The quadratic equation
q2 − θ1q − θ2 = 0.
has a unique real positive solution.
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix D.
Proposition 2. Let {M,B} ≥ 0 characterize public sector policy. For every feasible
belief function, ϕ(M, ε), let θ,XL, YL, XH , YH , θ1, θ2 be the numbers defined in Lemma 1.
There exists a unique incomplete participation rational expectations equilibrium, charac-
terized by the following conditions:
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• The equilibrium ratio of Arrow security prices q ≡ Q(L)/Q (H), is the unique
positive solution to the quadratic equation
q2 − θ1q − θ2 = 0. (24)
• The equilibrium Arrow security prices satisfy
Q (H) =
(q + YL [q + 1])M
XLq (1 + q) + (1 + q) (q + YL [q + 1])M
, (25)
and
Q (L) = qQ (H) . (26)
• The equilibrium state wages w˜(ε) are equal to
ω˜ (L) =
w (L)
(1 + q−1) piL
and ω˜ (H) =
w (H)
(1 + q) piH
. (27)
• The equilibrium state prices are equal to
p˜ (ε) =
w˜ (ε)
α
(
1− µW
w˜ (ε)
)1−α
, for ε ∈ {H,L}. (28)
• The price of a safe bond, Q, the money interest rate r and the date 2 value of the
wealth of workers are given by the expressions,
Q = Q (L) +Q (H) , r ≡ 1−Q
Q
, and W = rM. (29)
Conditional on the w˜(ε), p˜(ε) and Q(ε) characterized above, the equilibrium quantities
c1(ε), n1(ε) and M1 are given by Equations (16), while n2(ε), y(ε) and c2(ε) are given by
Equations (17) and (18).
Proposition 2, proved in Appendix E, establishes a mapping from beliefs to equilib-
rium prices and allocations. The following corollary confirms that these beliefs don’t only
affect nominal prices but also the corresponding real allocations.
Corollary 1. Whenever w (L) 6= w (H) ,
ni (L) 6= ni (H) , i ∈ {1, 2} and ci (L) 6= ci (H) , i ∈ {1, 2} . (30)
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Corollary 1 is proved in Appendix F. This is an example, for a monetary economy, of
Cass and Shell’s (1983) result that, when there is incomplete asset market participation,
“sunspots matter”.
6. Complete Participation Equilibrium in the World of Uncertainty
In this section we consider a counter-factual economy in which entrepreneurs are
present in the asset markets that open before their companies start operating and we
derive their decision rules in these markets. Although there are still multiple equilibria
in the complete participation case, sunspots cease to have real effects.
6.1. Entrepreneur’s Choice under Complete Participation. We continue to as-
sume that entrepreneurs only care about consumption and receive no part of the govern-
ment transfer. We alter the assumptions of the previous section by allowing entrepreneurs
to trade assets in period 1, subject to the first period constraint,
∑
ε∈{L,H}
Q (ε)A2 (ε) = 0. (31)
When the entrepreneur chooses labour optimally, her pre-tax profit in each state is given
by,
Π (ε) = (1− α)
(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) α
α−1
,
and her consumption in each state is constrained by the single budget constraint,
p (ε) c2 (ε) ≤ p (ε) Π(ε)− T2 + A2 (ε) , (32)
where T2 ≡ (B − rM)/2 is her nominal tax liability and the first term on the right
side of this inequality is the money value of profits. Substituting Inequality (32) into
(31) and using the no arbitrage condition and the definition of state prices leads to the
entrepreneur’s lifecycle constraint,
E [p˜ (ε) c2 (ε)] ≤ E [p˜ (ε) Π (ε)]−
(
B − rM
2
)
.
20
When the entrepreneur allocates consumption across states to maximize expected
utility she will choose the following consumption demands,
c2 (ε) =
E [p˜ (ε) Π (ε)]
p˜ (ε)
− 1
p˜ (ε)
(
B − rM
2
)
. (33)
Notice, and this is important, that dollar prices p (ε) or w (ε) no longer separately appear
in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint, which can be expressed entirely using state prices.
This corresponds to the fact that, instead of consuming the after tax profit in each state,
access to an insurance market allows the entrepreneur to smooth her consumption.
6.2. Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Complete Participation. In this
sub-section we characterize the equations that define equilibrium in the complete partic-
ipation economy.
Recall that W , the wealth of a worker, is defined as
W = E[w˜ (ε)] +
(
B
2
+
rM
2
)
. (34)
Using this definition, the labour market equilibrium condition is given by Equation (35),(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) 1
α−1
= 1− µ W
w˜ (ε)
, (35)
and equating the consumption demands of workers and entrepreneurs to the supply of
output, the goods market equilibrium condition is,(
1
α
w˜ (ε)
p˜ (ε)
) α
α−1
=
1
p˜ (ε)
{
E [p˜ (ε) Π (ε)]−
(
B − rM
2
)}
+ λ
W
p˜ (ε)
. (36)
Finally, equality of the demand and supply of money is represented by Equation (37),
γW = rM. (37)
The important difference of the equations that characterize the complete participation
economy from the incomplete participation economy, is to be found in Equation (33),
which no longer contains terms in w (L) or w (H). With the entrepreneur and worker
both able to fully insure, the actual realization of the nominal wage does not affect their
choices and, consequently, the labour and goods market equilibrium allocations.
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Definition 4. A complete participation rational expectations equilibrium comprises the
same elements as an incomplete participation rational expectations equilibrium (Definition
2). The allocation is such that Equations (35), (36) and Equation (37) hold when the
money wage in each state is given by Equation (22) and the state prices are defined from
the equilibrium price system by Equation (13).
Next, we turn to a proposition that characterizes the properties of employment,
output and the distribution of output in the complete participation rational expectations
equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Let {M,B} ≥ 0 characterize public sector policy. For every feasible
belief function, ϕ(M, ε), there exists a unique complete participation rational expectations
equilibrium, characterized by the following conditions:
• The equilibrium Arrow security prices satisfy
Q(H) =
M (2− γ) piH
(1 + q) (M (2− γ) +Bγ) piH + 2γw (H) and Q (L) = qQ (H) (38)
where q ≡ Q (L) /Q (H) is equal to
q =
w (H)
w (L)
piL
piH
. (39)
• The equilibrium state wages w˜(ε) are equal to
ω˜ (L) =
w (L)
(1 + q−1) piL
and ω˜ (H) =
w (H)
(1 + q) piH
. (40)
• The equilibrium state prices are equal to
p˜ (ε) =
w˜ (ε)
α
(
1− µW
w˜ (ε)
)1−α
for ε ∈ {H,L}. (41)
• The price of a safe bond, Q, the money interest rate r and the date 2 value of the
wealth of workers are given by the expressions,
Q = Q (L) +Q (H) , r ≡ 1−Q
Q
, and W = rM. (42)
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Conditional on the state prices, w˜(ε), p˜(ε) and Q(ε), the equilibrium quantities c1(ε),
n1(ε) and M1 can be found from Equations (16) while n2(ε), y(ε) and c2(ε) are charac-
terized in Equations (17) and (33). 
See Appendix G for a proof of this proposition. We also have the following corollary,
Corollary 2. Under full participation, the equilibrium associated with any belief function
has the property that
ni (L) = ni (H) , i ∈ {1, 2} and ci (L) = ci (H) , i ∈ {1, 2} .
Proof. The proof follows directly from the proposition. The formula for q implies that
state-wages w˜(ε) are the same in both states
q ≡ Q(L)
Q(H)
=
w (H)
w (L)
piL
piH
⇔ Q(L)w (L)
piLQ
=
Q(H)w (H)
piHQ
⇔ ω˜ (L) = ω˜ (H) .
Accordingly, straight from the definition, so are state-prices p˜(ε). The solutions to the
workers’ optimization problems, then imply that the corresponding real allocations are
state-invariant. This establishes that, in a complete participation rational expectations
equilibrium, there is complete insurance.
To clarify what is happening in the model, we now characterize the entrepreneur’s
asset portfolio.
Proposition 4. In the full participation model, the entrepreneur’s asset position is given
by
A2 (H) = piL
(
B − rM
2
)(
1− w (H)
w (L)
)
, A2 (L) = piH
(
B − rM
2
)(
1− w (L)
w (H)
)
.
Proposition 4 is proved in Appendix H.
An immediate implication of this proposition and the fact that w (H) > w (L) is
that A2 (H) is negative, while A2 (L) is positive. The entrepreneur uses the asset market
to buy insurance from the workers against the w (L) outcome and to sell insurance to the
workers against the w (H) outcome.
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When the entrepreneur is excluded from trade in Arrow securities, her utility is
higher in the high wage state for two reasons. First, the entrepreneur pays for part of
the nominal transfer which workers receive from the government. Higher nominal wages
mean that the real value of the transfer is lower which makes her better off when ε = H.
Second, the fact that workers are poorer in state ε = H means that they consume less
leisure and that equilibrium employment, output and the real value of profits are higher.
In contrast, workers are worse off in state ε = H. Both groups of agents will trade Arrow
securities up to the point at which their real consumption and leisure are constant across
states.
6.3. Nominal Bond and Equity Portfolios. In this sub-section we translate the ab-
stract notion of Arrow securities into the more familiar case in which agents cross-insure
using debt and equity. We assume that a nominal bond pays a dollar in both states, while
equities entitle their owners to a share of the entrepreneur’s nominal profit stream, which
we denote with the symbol Π˜ (ε) to distinguish it from the real profit stream, Π (ε) ,
Π˜(ε) ≡ p (ε) y(ε)− w(ε)n2(ε).
Using these definitions we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In the full participation model, the entrepreneur purchases nominal bonds
with a face value of
B2 ≡ B − rM
2
,
where
r =
1−Q
Q
.
The purchase of bonds by entrepreneurs is financed by selling a share ψ of the en-
trepreneur’s profit stream where
ψ =
QB
Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H)
.
Proof. See Appendix I.
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If workers and firms were to trade two assets, debt and equity, the entrepreneur
would use nominal bonds to insure herself against volatility in real tax expenditures. In
equilibrium, fluctuations in the nominal price level cause fluctuations in the real value
of tax liabilities that are perfectly insured by the nominal bonds she purchases from
workers. Workers provide this insurance by purchasing a share in the firm. This share is
risk free because fluctuations in the nominal profit stream are offset, in equilibrium, by
fluctuations in the price level.
The equilibrium with complete participation Pareto dominates the equilibrium in
the absence of complete participation because it provides an additional opportunity for
trade. In Section 7 we show how the government can restore Pareto efficiency, even if
entrepreneurs are not present in period 1, by trading on their behalf.
7. The Role of Qualitative Easing in a World of Incomplete
Participation
We are now ready to discuss the role of qualitative easing; a policy in which the
Central Bank, or the Treasury, makes trades of debt for equity in the asset markets. In
a complete markets environment, with complete participation, a policy of this kind will
have no real effects. We show that, in an environment with incomplete participation,
central bank trades in the asset markets can help restore that Pareto efficient allocation.
We return to the case where entrepreneurs are excluded from participating in asset
trades, and we assume that the treasury makes dollar denominated lump-sum transfers
worth QB to workers, paid for by issuing nominal debt with a face value of B. We retain
the assumption that workers trade two Arrow securities and we additionally account for
the possibility of trading debt and equity. In this environment, there are redundant assets
since the returns to debt and equity can be replicated by trades in Arrow securities.
A bond is a claim to B dollars in state ε that can be replicated by the purchase of
B Arrow securities of type L and B securities of type H. Equity, is a claim to ψΠ˜ (ε)
dollars in state ε that can be replicated by the purchase of a portfolio of ψΠ˜ (L) securities
of type L and ψΠ˜ (H) securities of type H where ψ denotes the share of the firm bought.
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We assume that workers purchase Arrow securities and they do not buy or sell bonds
or equities.13 We continue to assume that the central bank purchases debt ACB where,
M = QACB.
In addition, we allow the bank to make supplementary trades in debt and equity, subject
to the constraint that these supplementary security purchases are self-financing,
M = QACB +QA˜CB + PEψCB.
The self-financing condition implies that
QA˜CB + PEψCB = 0.
Here, A˜CB are additional purchases of debt by the central bank that may be positive or
negative, ψCB is the number of shares to the nominal profit stream that is bought or sold
by the central bank and
PE = Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H) ,
is the price of the whole firm. We allow short sales so that ψCB may be negative.
Let S denote seigniorage revenues associated with money issuance and define
S˜ (ε) = S +
[
Π˜ (ε)− A˜CB
]
,
where the term in the square brackets is the additional profit or loss associated with
the risky component of the bank’s balance sheet. Using these definitions, we arrive at
the balance sheet of the central bank presented in Table 2. As in our previous model,
the seigniorage revenues from money creation are repaid to the treasury. However, there
is now risk associated with the central bank’s “unconventional” asset holdings. The
following modified definition of an equilibrium accounts for the fact that the central bank
trades in the asset markets.
13This assumption is made for convenience. Because bonds and equities are redundant securities, the
allocation of worker’s assets across the two Arrow securities plus debt and equity is indeterminate.
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Assets Liabilities
QACB M
QS
QA˜CB PEψCB
ECB
Table 2. The Central Bank Balance Sheet
Definition 5. A rational expectations equilibrium with a self-financing stabilization policy
is a monetary and a fiscal policy {M,B,ACB, ψCB}, a belief function ϕ(M, ε), an alloca-
tion {ci (ε) , ni (ε)}i=1,2 , y (ε) ,M1}ε∈{H,L} and a set of state-dependent prices {p˜ (ε) , w˜ (ε),
Q (ε) , r}ε∈{H,L} that satisfies budget balance, optimality and the self-financing condition,
QA˜CB + ψCBPE = 0,
where
PE = Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H) .
An equilibrium price system, {p˜ (ε) , w˜ (ε) , Q (ε) , r}ε∈{H,L}, is a non-negative 7-tuple
such that equations (35) and (36) hold in each state, Equation (37) holds, and the money
wage in each state is given by the belief function, Equation (22).
Proposition 6, establishes that there exists a set of central bank trades that leads to
the same real allocations as those in the complete participation case of Proposition 3.
Proposition 6. Let
{
M,B, A˜CB, ψCB
}
≥ 0 characterize public sector policy, and let{
w (L) , w (H)
}
> 0 be wages implied by a feasible belief function ϕ(M, ε) such that
w (ε) ≥
(
µ+ αλ
)
B(
1 + λ− µ)− 2λα
Let the central bank buy debt equal to A˜CB, financed by selling equities, ψCB, where,
A˜CB = B − rM, and ψCB = −Q
(
B − rM
Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H)
)
. (43)
The prices Q (L), Q (H) and r = (1−Q) /Q and the money value of profits in each state
Π˜ (L) and Π˜ (H), are those defined in Proposition 4.
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Under this policy, there exists a unique equilibrium in which allocations are the same
as those implemented in the complete participation rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix J.
The fact that the equilibrium allocations are identical to those under complete par-
ticipation means that the central bank is able to restore efficiency. In the proof of the
proposition we establish that the central bank’s position in the asset markets is twice
the position that would be taken by the entrepreneur in the counter-factual complete
markets equilibrium. Hence the workers’ portfolios of risky assets will be larger under
complete participation than without. In both cases, the real value of the workers’ and
entrepreneurs’ after tax incomes will be stabilized under the optimal policy.
Corollary 3. In the stabilization equilibrium, the return on a real indexed bond is equal
to the real return from holding equity.
Proof. In the Pareto efficient equilibrium the real value of profit is the same in both
states. It follows immediately that the return to an indexed bond is the same as the
return to an equity share.
This corollary implies that, when all uncertainty is non-fundamental, the central
bank can implement the optimal policy by standing ready to trade indexed bonds at the
same price as claims to the stock market. By doing so, it would end up holding the
optimal asset portfolio
{
A˜CB, ψCB
}
described in Proposition 6.
In our model quantitative easing and qualitative easing play two different roles. Since
we have no goods market trade in period 1, we cannot talk about inflation in our model.
But we can talk about the nominal price level. And it follows from our assumption that
the money supply enters the belief function, that the central bank can influence the level
of nominal prices and wages targeting the money supply, M .
Qualitative easing has a different purpose. When all uncertainty is non-fundamental,
the optimal financial policy is to intervene in the asset markets by offering to trade indexed
bonds for equity and to set the return on these two assets equal to each other. A policy
of this kind cannot affect the mean or the variance of the price level. But, by targeting
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the risk composition of the central bank balances sheet, QualE can eliminate the real
effects of nominal price level fluctuations.
8. Summary
Buiter (2008) made the distinction between Quantitative Easing, defined as an in-
crease in the size of the central bank balance sheet, and Qualitative Easing, defined as a
change in its risk composition. In this paper we have outlined a theory that provides a
channel by which Qualitative Easing influences asset prices. According to our narrative,
some agents cannot insure themselves against uncertain outcomes, leading to inefficient
real fluctuations even when all uncertainty is non-fundamental. By trading debt for equity
in the asset markets, the central bank can provide a substitute for the missing insurance
market and, in so doing, stabilize asset price movements and make everyone better off.
Our explanation builds on the idea that nominal transfers in the presence of an
indeterminate price level can lead to different real allocations. We highlight sunspot
fluctuations because standard accounts of asset market dynamics struggle to account for
the volume of trades that we observe in real world asset markets (Milgrom and Stokey,
1982), and for the the observed volatility in asset prices, relative to dividend movements
(Shiller, 1981). We explain these features of data by exploiting shifts across different
equilibria in the presence of incomplete participation. In our view, significant portions
of asset price fluctuations in the real world are caused by self-fulfilling shifts from one
equilibrium to another that are associated with inefficient fluctuations in wealth.
Although we have explained our case in a simple two-period model, our argument is
more general than the model used to illustrate it. In recent work (Farmer and Zabczyk,
2019) on the overlapping generations model, for example, we have demonstrated that
the price level can be indeterminate in the neighbourhood of dynamically efficient steady
states even when monetary policy is active. Our work thus provides an example of a
fully dynamic environment where equilibrium prices and wages are potentially subject to
pure sunspot shocks, and where the QualE policy similar to the one we describe could
help replicate the efficient, “full-participation” equilibrium. The fact that asset price
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volatility is Pareto inefficient provides, we believe, a strong case to make qualitative
easing a permanent component of future financial policy.
Should the central bank implement a policy of asset price stabilization? Although
our model provides a justification for stabilization of asset price volatility, our argument
has two caveats.
First, if some or all of real-world asset price fluctuations have fundamental causes,
the case for fully stabilizing asset prices breaks down. There would still exist asset-market
policies, implemented by the central bank, that could increase the welfare of those unable
to trade in assets; but these policies would not take the form of intervening in the asset
markets to equate the real returns to stocks and bonds.
Second, we have modeled those active in asset markets (workers) as one homogenous
group. If that was not the case, however, the results of Goenka and Pre´chac (2006) suggest
that stabilizing asset prices could reduce welfare for at least some of those initially active
in asset markets; in other words, the intervention we propose here might not constitute
a Pareto improvement.14 In line with a large literature on the benefits of trade, we
conjecture that the central bank intervention could be augmented by an appropriate
transfer scheme ensuring that no group of agents loses out on the stabilization package.
Exploring how such transfers could be designed, in a more quantitatively realistic model,
would, we think, constitute an interesting extension of our work.
14Kajii (2007) generalizes the Goenke-Pre´chac result to a larger set of economies and Kang (2019) proposes
a measure of aggregate welfare in incomplete market economies. In a related paper, Cozzi et al. (2017)
show that non-fundamental uncertainty may lead to welfare gains for some consumers in economies
with information frictions.
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Appendix A. The Life-cycle Budget Constraint Under Certainty
Workers face the following budget constraint in period 1,
M1 +QA1 − TR = 0, (A1)
where, TR is a nominal transfer to workers by the treasury. This transfer can be held as
money, M1, or interest bearing bonds, A1 with Q denoting their period 1 price.
In period 2, workers face the constraint,
pc1 + w(1− n1) ≤ w +M1 + A1 − T1. (A1)
Here, w is the money wage, p is the price of commodities, n1 is labour supply, c1 is
consumption and T1 is a lump-sum, nominal tax obligation. Putting together the budget
constraints of workers for periods 1 and 2, and rearranging terms, leads to the life-cycle
constraint,
pc1 + w(1− n1) + rM ≤ W , (A2)
where
W ≡ w + TR
Q
− T1 (A3)
is the dollar value, at date 2, of a worker’s wealth and r ≡ (1 − Q)/Q is the money
interest rate. These are Equations (1) and (2) in the text.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Combining the definition of wealth from Equation (5) with the money market
clearing condition, Equation (12), and using the fact that λ + µ + γ = 1, we have the
following expression for wealth in equilibrium
W = 2w +B
1 + λ+ µ
. (B1)
To derive the expression for the equilibrium value of r, we use the money market equilib-
rium condition, Equation (12), while the real wage expression follows from inverting the
labour market clearing condition, Equation (10).
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Feasibility requires that
n = 1− µW
w
> 0, (B2)
for both types. Combining Equations (B1) and (B2) leads to
w ≥ µB
1 + λ− µ. (B3)
Feasibility also requires non-negative consumption for entrepreneurs,
c2 = (1− α)
(
1
α
w
p
) α
α−1
− (B − rM)
2p
> 0. (B4)
Using the definition of equilibrium prices and wealth from Equation (1), and market
clearing, Equations (8)–(9), evaluated at equilibrium prices, we arrive at
w ≥ (µ+ αλ)B
(1 + λ− µ)− 2λα. (B5)
Since
(µ+ αλ)B
(1 + λ− µ)− 2λα ≥
µB
(1 + λ− µ)− 2λα ≥
µB
(1 + λ− µ)
therefore the second inequality implies the first, leading to the condition in the statement
of Proposition 1.
Appendix C. The Life-cycle Budget Constraint Under Uncertainty
In period 1, workers receive a transfer TR that may be used to acquire money M1,
and buy or sell Arrow securities A1(ε),
∑
ε∈{H,L}
Q (ε)A1 (ε) +M1 ≤ TR. (C1)
In period 2 state ε, workers face the constraint,
p (ε) c1 (ε) + w (ε) (1− n1 (ε)) ≤ w (ε) + A (ε) +M1 − T1. (C2)
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Substituting for A1 (ε) from Inequality (C2) into Inequality (C1) gives the following
lifecycle budget constraint,
∑
ε∈{H,L}
Q (ε) [p (ε) c1 (ε) + w (ε) (1− n1 (ε))− w (ε)−M1 + T1] +M1 ≤ TR. (C3)
From the no-arbitrage assumption we have the following connection between Q,
Q(H) and Q(L) ∑
ε∈{H,L}
Q (ε) = Q, (C4)
Using the definitions of state prices we may write the lifecycle budget constraint of
a worker as follows,
E [p˜ (ε) c1 (ε) + w˜ (ε) (1− n1 (ε))] + rM1 ≤ W , (C5)
where workers’ wealth in the model with uncertainty, but complete markets, is defined as
W ≡ E[w˜ (ε)] +
(
B
2
+
rM
2
)
. (C6)
Here E is the expectations operator, defined using the probability distribution {piH , piL}
and the term in the last bracket denotes the net transfer from the government. These
are Equations (14) and (15) in the text.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. From the statement of Lemma 1 we have that
θ1 ≡ [XH (1 + YL)−XL (1 + YH)]
XLYH
, and θ2 ≡ XHYL
XLYH
. (D1)
Define the quadratic equation in q,
q2 − θ1q − θ2 = 0, (D2)
and let r1 and r2 be the roots of this quadratic, given by the expression
r =
1
2
(
θ1 ±
√
θ21 + 4θ2
)
. (D3)
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It follows from the fact that θ2 is positive that both roots are real and that there is a
unique non-negative root.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the following three facts that follow from the definitions of market clear-
ing, Equations (19)–(21). First, using money market clearing, Equation (21),
W =(1−Q)M
Q
1
γ
≡ x
γ
, (E1)
define the variable x,
x ≡ (1−Q)M
Q
≡ rM. (E2)
Second, putting together labour and goods market clearing, Equations (19) and (20),
with Equations (E1) and (E2) we have that,
1− θx
w˜ (ε)
=
x
2w (ε)
− B
2w (ε)
, ε ∈ {L,H} , (E3)
where we define
θ ≡ λ+ µ
γ
. (E4)
Third, we use the definition of w˜ (ε),
w˜ (ε) ≡ Q (ε)w (ε)
Qpiε
, ε ∈ {L,H} . (E5)
Substituting (E5) into (E3) gives,
1− Qpiεθx
Q (ε)w (ε)
=
x
2w (ε)
− B
2w (ε)
, ε ∈ {L,H} . (E6)
Rearranging this equation and using the no arbitrage condition, Q = Q (L)+Q (H) leads
to the following expression for x
x =
[2w (L) +B]Q (L)
Q (L) + 2piLθ [Q (L) +Q (H)]
=
[2w (H) +B]Q (H)
Q (H) + 2piHθ [Q (L) +Q (H)]
. (E7)
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Next use the definition of q ≡ Q (L) /Q (H) , and divide the numerator and denom-
inator of Equation (E7) by Q (H) to give,
[2w (L) +B] q
q + 2piLθ [1 + q]
=
[2w (H) +B]
1 + 2piHθ [1 + q]
. (E8)
Rearranging this equation and using the definitions or terms from 1 leads to the quadratic
equation in q,
q2 − θ1q − θ2 = 0. (E9)
which, as we showed in Lemma 1, has a unique non-negative real root. Next note that
x ≡M (1−Q)
Q
≡
(
1
QH
− 1− q
)
M
1 + q
(E10)
and use Equation (E8) to write,
x =
XLq
q + YL (1 + q)
. (E11)
Combining Equations (E10) and (E11) leads to the expression for Q (H), Equation (25)
in Proposition 2. Equation (26) follows from the definition of Q. To derive Equations
(27) use the definition of w (ε) from Equations (13).
Equation (28) follows from the labour market clearing equation and Equation (29)
follows from Equation (E1) and the no arbitrage assumption. It remains to check that
Inequality (23) is sufficient to guarantee that labour supply is feasible and that (23) guar-
antees that entrepreneurs’ consumption is non-negative. That follows from the fact that
these assumptions guarantee feasibility in each state individually and therefore feasibility
in a convex combination of the states as well.
Appendix F. Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Labour supply is given by the expression
n1 (ε) = 1− µ W
w˜ (ε)
, (F1)
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and consumption of workers equals
c1 (ε) = λ
W
w˜ (ε)
. (F2)
Hence to establish inequalities (30) we need only show that
w˜ (L) 6= w˜ (H) . (F3)
But from Equation (E3) we have that
θx
w˜ (ε)
=
B
2w (ε)
− x
2w (ε)
+ 1, (F4)
from which it follows that w˜ (L) = w˜ (H) if and only if, w (L) = w (H) . The inequality
of the consumption of entrepreneurs across states follows from the fact that their income
is a function of the real wage.
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Combining labour market equilibrium, Equation (35) with goods market equilib-
rium (36) leads to
1
α
(
1− µ W
w˜ (ε)
)
=
1
w˜ (ε)
{
E [p˜ (ε) Π (ε)]−
(
B − rM
2
)}
+λ
W
w˜ (ε)
, ε ∈ {L,H} . (G1)
Because these two state equations are identical (the term in the wiggly brackets is a
constant) it immediately follows that
ω˜ (L) = w˜ (H) ≡ w˜. (G2)
Using this fact, and the definition of w˜ (ε) gives,
q ≡ Q (L)
Q (H)
=
w (H) piL
w (L) piH
. (G3)
This establishes the expression for q, Equation (39), in the statement of Proposition 3.
Next we seek expressions for Q (L) and Q (H) individually. Combining the definition
of workers wealth, Equation (15), with the money market equilibrium condition, Equation
39
(37), and using Equation (G2) gives the following equation linking ω˜ and r,
W = rM
γ
= w˜ +
B
2
+
rM
2
(G4)
Note also that
w˜ =
w (H)Q (H)
QpiH
. (G5)
The no arbitrage condition, Q = Q (L) +Q (H) implies that
Q (H)
Q
=
1
1 + q
. (G6)
Using no arbitrage and the definition of r we also have that
r =
1−Q
Q
=
1−QL −QH
QL +QH
=
1
QH
− (1 + q)
1 + q
, (G7)
which simplifies to give,
QH =
1
(1 + r) (1 + q)
. (G8)
Next, we rearrange Equation (G4)
rM
(
1− γ
γ
)
= 2
w (H)
(1 + q)piH
+B, (G9)
to find the following expression for (1 + r)
(1 + r) =
(
M
(
2− γ
γ
)
+ 2
w (H)
(1 + q) piH
+B
)(
M
(
2− γ
γ
))−1
. (G10)
Finally, combining (G10) with (G8) and using the definition of γ gives Equation (38) in
the statement of Proposition 3, which is the expression we seek
QH =
M (2− γ) piH
(1 + q) (M (2− γ) +Bγ) piH + 2γw (H) . (G11)
Equations (40) follow immediately from the definitions of state wages and Equation
(41) follows from labour market clearing. The standard feasibility condition guarantees
that labour supply for each worker and the consumption of entrepreneurs are each non-
negative in equilibrium.
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Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From the entrepreneur’s budget constraint, Equation (32),
p (ε) c2 (ε) ≤ p (ε) Π (ε)−
(
B − rM
2
)
+ A2 (ε) . (H1)
From the solution to the entrepreneur’s problem, we have that
c2 (ε) =
E [p˜ (ε) Π (ε)]
p˜ (ε)
− 1
p˜ (ε)
(
B − rM
2
)
. (H2)
But from Proposition 3, p˜ (ε) is the same in both states and thus,
c2 (ε) = Π (ε)− 1
p˜ (ε)
(
B − rM
2
)
. (H3)
Rearranging Equation (H1) and combining it with (H3) gives the following expression,
A2 (ε) =
(
B − rM
2
)(
1− p (ε)
p˜ (ε)
)
. (H4)
Finally, from the definitions of p˜ (ε) and q we have that
p (H)
p˜ (H)
= piH (1 + q) ,
p (L)
p˜ (L)
= piL
(
1 + q−1
)
. (H5)
Combining equations (H4) and (H5)and using the fact that
q =
w (H)
w (L)
piL
piH
, (H6)
gives
A2 (H) = piL
(
B − rM
3
)(
1− w (H)
w (L)
)
, (H7)
A2 (L) = piH
(
B − rM
3
)(
1− w (L)
w (H)
)
, (H8)
which are the expressions we seek.
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Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. By purchasing bonds with face value
B2 =
B − rM
2
, (I1)
the entrepreneur consumes
c2 (ε) =
Π˜ (ε)
p (ε)
− (B − rM)
2p (ε)
+
[
B2
p (ε)
− ψ Π˜ (ε)
p (ε)
]
, (I2)
where
A2 (ε) ≡ B2 − ψΠ˜ (ε) , (I3)
is the dollar value of Arrow securities in state ε. This is equal to the face value of debt,
B2, minus the share of profits, ψΠ (ε) that was sold to finance the purchase of debt. We
established in Proposition 3, that Π˜ (ε) /p (ε) is the same in both states. It follows that
if
B2 =
B − rM
2
, (I4)
then the entrepreneurs’ consumption is independent of the state. The share of profits that
the entrepreneur sells to workers, ψ, is defined by the entrepreneur’s budget constraint
in period 1,
QB2 − ψPE = 0, (I5)
where
PE = Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H) , (I6)
is the price of a claim to the money value of profits.
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 6
To prove this proposition we show first that, if the security prices Q (L) and Q (H)
and the nominal profit streams Π˜ (L) and Π˜ (H) are equal to the equilibrium values
defined in Proposition 4, then the portfolio defined by Equation (43) stabilizes the real
value of tax revenues.
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In state ε, the money value of tax revenues levied by the treasury is given by the
expression,
T (ε) = [B − S]−
[
A˜CB + ψCBΠ˜ (ε)
]
. (J1)
To stabilize the real value of tax revenues the central bank must take a position such that
[B − S]−
[
A˜CB + ψCBΠ˜ (L)
]
w (L)
=
[B − S]−
[
A˜CB + ψCBΠ˜ (H)
]
w (H)
. (J2)
By holding additional bonds equal to
A˜CB = [B − S] , (J3)
Equation (J2) gives
T (L)
w(L)
≡ ψCB Π˜ (L)
w (L)
= ψCB
Π˜ (H)
w (H)
≡ T (H)
w(H)
. (J4)
But from the definition of the money value of profits,
Π˜ (ε) = Π (ε) p (ε) = Π (ε)w (ε)
p˜ (ε)
w˜ (ε)
, (J5)
with the last equality implied by p (ε) /w (ε) = p˜ (ε) /w˜ (ε) .
Combining these expressions gives
T (L)
w(L)
≡ ψCBΠ (L) p˜ (L)
w˜ (L)
= ψCBΠ (H)
p˜ (H)
w˜ (H)
≡ T (H)
w(H)
. (J6)
where, from Proposition 3, Π (H) = Π (L). Hence the portfolio
A˜CB = B − rM, and ψCB = −Q
(
B − rB
Q (L) Π˜ (L) +Q (H) Π˜ (H)
)
, (J7)
is self-financing and stabilizes the real value of tax revenues as claimed.
Next we establish that this tax policy generates the same after tax wealth positions
for entrepreneurs and workers that they would choose if entrepreneurs could self insure.
We showed in Proposition that entrepreneurs would choose to hold debt equal to
B2 =
B − rM
2
. (J8)
43
In the counter-factual complete participation equilibrium the entrepreneur’s wealth equals
Π (ε)− 1
2
(
B − rM
w (ε)
)
+
(
B2 − ψPE
w (ε)
)
, (J9)
where 1
2
(B−rM)/w(ε), is the real value of her tax obligation and {B2, ψPE} , is the debt
and equity portfolio that she takes to offset fluctuations in after-tax wealth.
In contrast, in the equilibrium with policy stabilization, the after tax wealth of the
entrepreneur is
Π (ε)− 1
2
(
B − rM
w (ε)
)
+
1
2
(
A˜CB − ψCBPE
w (ε)
)
. (J10)
It follows immediately that if the central bank chooses a policy where
A˜CB = 2B2 = B − rM, (J11)
then the after tax wealth of the entrepreneur is identical in the equilibrium with stabi-
lization as in the counter-factual complete markets equilibrium. It follows from Walras
law that stabilizing the entrepreneurs income at its complete participation value also
stabilizes workers’ wealth at its complete participation value.
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